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1 Introduction
In this note we propose an extension of the article Can a Brain Drain be
good for growth in the source economy? by Mountford (1997). Di¤erently
from the standard Brain Drain literature, the Mountfords model identies
some conditions in which the incentive to acquire skills may be strengthened by
the possibility to migrate. In particular, he shows that when migration is not a
certainty, a Brain Drain (BD hereafter) may increase the average education level
of those left behind in the source economy. These results are also argued most
recently by Stark andWang (2002), Stark et al. (1997) and Stark (2004) and this
new eld of the BD literature is called Brain Gain. The main mechanism of the
Mountfords model is that when region J is more productive than region I and
the probability to migrate, , is low, then BD may increase average productivity
and equality in the source economy. In particular, the two key assumptions
of the model: high di¤erentials on the productivity between the sending and
the receiving country and absence of public education (no government role is
analyzed in Mountford) bound the result to Less Developed Countries where
typically there are not su¢ cient resources to invest in public education and
which su¤er a drain of high skilled workers to High Developed Countries.
Aim of this note is to extend the Mountfords model in two di¤erent di-
rections - by introducing public education and taxation/subsidies - in order to
demonstrate that these new specications help us to extend the analysis without
loose the main results of the original model. Furthermore, this new version can
be useful to analyze the new European Union (EU hereafter) scenario where it
is possible to identify the existence of the two key factors that could drive the
BD in a Brain Gain. From one side, we can distinguish two di¤erent clubs
of members: the former, with higher productivity and growth, and the new
members with lower productivity1 . From the other side, during the rst period
of this enlargement the real opportunity to migrate in the former EU countries
for high skilled workers of new members ( in Mountford) it is not very high2 .
To complete the analysis and test the possibility of Brain Gain, we need to
1Labour costs in 2006 varied by one to twenty in the EU27. Expressed in euro, the average
hourly labour cost3 in the EU27 in 2006 was e20.35. Sweden (e32.16) had the highest
hourly labour cost in 2006, followed by Denmark (e31.98 in 2005), Luxembourg (e31.98) and
Belgium (e31.58). Bulgaria (e1.65), Romania (e2.68), Latvia (e3.41) and Lithuania (e4.21)
had the lowest. Within the structure of the labour costs, the highest share of social security
costs paid by the employer was found in Sweden (30.6%), followed by Belgium (30.3%) and
France (28.6%) and the lowest shares in Malta (6.9%), Denmark (10.9%), Slovenia (13.4%)
and Cyprus (15.1%). (Eurostat Yearbook 2008).
2Analyzing the migration policies of the EU we identify a dual approach: a) internal mi-
gration of EU nationals has been harmonized at the EU level, becoming essentially free by
2014 for the whole EU27. b) External migration rules are not harmonized as they generally
fall within the responsibility of each individual member state. Furthermore, from 2006 policies
relating to the free movement of workers of the EU-15 states could be classied into three cat-
egories: i) Keeping the restrictions in place for at least three more years: Austria, Germany;
ii) Lifting the restrictions gradually, within the next three years: Belgium, Denmark, France,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands; iii) Keeping labor markets open/removing restrictions: Fin-
land, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Italy, United Kingdom; All countries except
Finland have opted for transition periods for workers from Bulgaria and Romania.
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extend the theoretical framework proposed by Mountford. First we introduce a
governments role in the educational decisions of agents thought the introduc-
tion of educational subsidies. The main point is the stylized fact that education
is predominantly a public good in the EU3 . Second we introduce the presence
of taxation for educated agents and subsidies to uneducated ones in order to
capture from one side the redistributive role of the EU governments and from
the other side the necessity for the government to compensate the expenses on
public education.
The note is organized as follows. There are two sections which follow the
introductory section: the Autarchic case and the Mobility case) rst section of
the Mountfords article. First, we denes the main assumptions and the struc-
ture of the models. Second, we introduce the government by public education,
subsidies and taxes. Third, we analyze the new model and we compare our
results with the Mountfords ones. Finally we concludes with recommendations
for further extensions in the future.
2 Autarchic case
Following the Mountfords framework, we propose a model that analyzes a small
open overlapping generations economy with one good and perfect capital mo-
bility. The worlds one good is produced under constant returns to scale by two
factors, capital and e¢ ciency units of labor. There are a continuum of agents
in each generation (normalized to unity) and there is not population growth.
Agents chose if be educated or uneducated.
Mountford shows how a BD can be benecial to the productivity level of
the source economy when there is a "growth externality" associated with the
proportion of educated workers in the economy in the previous period.
Let us resume the main assumptions of the Mountfords model4 . Individ-
ual possess di¤erent levels of latent ability (ei) distributed over the closed
interval [0; E], according to the density function g
 
ei

, where, by denition,R E
0
geidei = 1; g
 
ei

> 0 8 ei 2 [0; E] : Agents exist in an overlapping genera-
tions world and live for three periods. In the rst periods can invest resources
in education, resources that they borrow from the capital market at the worlds
rate of interest r. The cost of education is assumed xed at c units of output.
Agents educated obtain ei e¢ ciency units of labor in the second period of their
life and uneducated have only one e¢ ciency unit of labor. Agents can only work
in the second period and in this period the agent must repay the debt of the
rst period and save in order to consume in the third and last period of life. All
3 In Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece and Poland the totality of the tertiary education
is provided by government Moreover in Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Ireland
Italy, Portugal, Slovak Republic and Sweden we have al least the 80% of tertiary education
publicly nanced. Finally, In Hungary, Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom the share is
from 70 to 80 percent (OECD 2004).
4See chapter 2 of Mountfors (1997) for furthermore details on production of goods, factor
prices, education decision and growth externality.
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agents have the same preferences and access to the same technology but di¤er-
ent levels of latent ability. The optimal decision for agent i will be to invest in
education if tw(k)ei > tw(k) + c(1 + r) where w(k)  [f (k)  kf(k)] is the
wage rate per e¢ ciency unit of labor and t is the level of technology. Thus all
agents with a latent ability greater than e is uniquely dened by the following
equality:
e =
tw(k) + c(1 + r
)
tw(k)
 eM : (1)
Let us now dene eM the value of e identied by Mountford in the no
migration case (eq. 7, pg. 291). In our paper, this is the value of e in which
there is no migration and there is not a government role on education decision.
Furthermore, let us introduce new hypotheses to the Mountfords model in
order to extend his results. Let us assume that there exist a government which
taxes educated workers, subsidizes educational costs and has a redistributive
role. The timing of the model does not change in the rst and third period.
Although, in the second period, educated agents pay a lump sum tax T and
receive a subsidy of c (1 + r) where  2 [0; 1] and uneducated agents receive b:
Following these new assumptions, in autarchic case and with taxation/subsidies
scheme, e, is uniquely dened by the following equality:
eA;T = e
M +
b+ T   c(1 + r)
tw(k)
: (2)
Let us introduce a Budget Constraint for the government
stT   stc  (1  st)b = 0; (3)
where st =
R E
eA;T
geidei is the amount of educated agents. When, as in Mount-
ford, we consider the case of uniformly distributed abilities (i.e. g
 
ei

= 1E );
equation 3 becomes
(1  e

E
) (T   c)  e

E
b = 0: (4)
Furthermore, let us assume that the government maximizes the utility of the
worst-o¤ workers, by using a Maximin criterion. By denition, this workers is
the uneducated and
U (tw(k) + b) = U
 
tw(k)tw(k)e

A;T   T   (1  ) c(1 + r)

:
The maximization program of the government is
Max
b;T
U (tw(k) + b) (5)
s.to stT  stc+ (1  st)b
or, equivalently
Max
T
b (6)
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where, by equations (2) and (3)
b =  1
2
 
tw(k)e
M + 2T   2c  cr+
+
1
2
  
tw(k)e
M + 2T   2c  cr2+
+4
 
tw(k)
 
E   eM  T + c(1 + r) (T   c)
 1
2
:
Solving equation (6), the optimal value of taxation is
T  =
tw(k)

E2    eM2
4E
+ c+

eMr
2E

c  (cr
)2
4tw(k)E
> 0 (7)
and e; becomes
eA;T = e
M + tw(k)

E2    eM2+ 2  eMr c  (cr)2
tw(k)
> eM : (8)
These results are resumed in the following propositions.
Proposition 1 Consider the economy described above. There exist a positive
level of optimal taxation which is compatible with a redistributive role of a gov-
ernment and public subsidies to education costs.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 The presence of governments implies an higher amount of ed-
ucated agents respect the case without government analyzed in Mountford.
Corollary 3 Higher is eM , lower is the gap between eA;G and e
M and higher
are the subsidies and the educational costs, higher are this gap.
Proof. See Appendix.
The rst proposition implies that, starting from the theoretical framework
proposed by Mountford in the autarchic case, it is possible introduce a gov-
ernment which subsidizes the education and realizes a redistributive policy by
implementing a maximization program. Furthermore, the second proposition
give us a comparison between the Mountfords results and the model with pub-
lic education and taxes. In the autarchic case, the introduction of a government
implies an increase in the amount of educated. Furthermore (Corollary 3) the
gap between the amount of educated workers in the case without and with gov-
ernment is negatively correlated to eM and positively correlated to the amount
of subsidies and educational costs.
Finally, as in Mountford, we assume that there is an economy wide growth
externality related to the proportion of educated workers in the economy in the
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previous period. Thus t =  (st 1), 0 (st 1) > 0,  (0) = 1, and  (1) is nite.
Also in this extended model the only dynamics depend on from the growth
externality and the proportion of educated workers in period t is an increasing
function of educated workers in t  1.
Analyzing the dynamics of the model, we derive the following proposition.
Proposition 4 When we introduce the government, there exist at least one
steady state equilibrium for st as in the Mountford case.
Proof. See Appendix.
This fourth proposition species that the introduction of public education,
taxes and subsidies does not change the dynamics identied in the model of
Mountford and consequently we have at least one steady state equilibrium.
3 Mobility case
In this section we introduce migration (only for educated agents)5 . As in Mount-
ford, we examine the case where emigration is limited by the receiving country -
i.e. immigration controls - the probability of successful emigration  is indepen-
dent of the number of workers who are eligible to migrate, and the emigration
policy is fully anticipated. Thus all agents with a latent ability greater than e
is uniquely dened by the following equality:
e =
tw(k) + c(1 + r
)
wF + (1  )tw(k)  e
M

where wF is the wage per e¢ ciency unit of labor in the world economy (by
assumption it is always higher than in the small open economy tw(k)). We
dene eM the value of e
 identied by Mountford in the migration case (eq.
14, pg. 294). In our paper, this is the value of e in which there is migration
and there is not a government role on education decision. When we introduce
a government e becomes
e;G = e
M
 +
b+ (1  )T   c(1 + r)
w
(9)
where w = wF + (1  )tw(k) > tw(k):
The Budget Constraint is,
(1  e

E
) ((1  )T   c)  e

E
b = 0: (10)
The maximization program of the government is
5See paragraph 2.2 of Mounftford (1997) for furthermore details on the migration hy-
pothesis and the analysis of the general emigration. We focus the attention on the BD case
(paragraph 2.2.1.2).
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Max
b;T
U (tw(k) + b)
s.to (1  ) stT  stc+ (1  st)b
or, equivalently
Max
T
b (11)
where, by equations (9) and (10)
b =  
 
weM + 2 (1  )T   2c  cr

2
+
+
1
2
  
weM + 2 (1  )T   2c  cr
2
+
+4
 
w
 
E   eM
  (1  )T + c(1 + r) ((1  )T   c)
 1
2
:
Solving equation (11), the optimal value of taxation is
T  =
w

E2    eM 2
4E (1  ) +
c
(1  ) +

eM r

2 (1  )E

c  (cr
)2
4 (1  )wE > T

(12)
and e;G; becomes
e;G = e
M
 + w

E2    eM 2+ 2  eM r c  (cr)2w : (13)
These results are resumed in the following propositions.
Proposition 5 Consider the economy described above. In presence of migra-
tion, there exist a positive level of optimal taxation which is compatible with a
redistributive role of a government and public subsidies to education costs.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 6 The presence of governments implies an higher amount of ed-
ucated agents respect the case without government analyzed in Mountford.
Corollary 7 Higher is eM , lower is the gap between eA;G and e
M and higher
are the subsidies and the educational costs, higher are this gap.
Corollary 8 The migration implies an higher level of taxation respect the autarchic
case.
Proof. See Appendix.
Correspondingly the rst proposition, the fth proposition implies that,
starting from the theoretical framework proposed by Mountford in the mobility
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case, it is possible introduce a government which subsidizes the education and
realizes a redistributive policy by implementing a maximization program. Fur-
thermore, the sixth proposition give us a comparison between the Mountfords
results and the model with public education and taxes in presence of mobility.
Also comparing the mobility case of both version, the introduction of a govern-
ment implies an increase in the amount of educated. Furthermore (by Corollary
6) the gap between the amount of educated workers in the case without and
with government is negatively correlated to eM and positively correlated to the
amount of subsidies and educational costs. Finally (by Corollary 7) according to
the economic intuition, the migration implies an higher level of taxation respect
the autarchic case in order to compensate the decrease of the contributive basis.
As in Mountford, we study the case in which the source economy can benet
from a Brain Gain. The result of this analysis is summarized by the following
proposition.
Proposition 9 Consider the economy described above. In presence of migra-
tion and a government. There will exist a positive optimal level of "Brain Drain"
emigration if
g
 
eA;T
0B@ (tw(k) + c(1 + r
)) 
 (1  2tw(k)  2c(1 + (1  ) r))+
 

E2    eM 2 (tw(k))2   (cr)2
1CA  wF   tw(k)
(tw(k))
2 >
1
4
:
Proof. See Appendix.
As in Mountford, the source economy can benet from a brain drain so long
as there are a su¢ cient number of people who decide to be educated. Analyzing
the e¤ect of the government introduction in the Mountford model, we derive
the following proposition.
Proposition 10 The presence of governments implies that the conditions to
obtain brain gain are more strict respect the case without government analyzed
in Mountford.
Proof. See Appendix.
The ninth proposition implies that the introduction of the government in the
model of Mountford does not prevent the existence of a positive optimal level of
BD (and consequently a Brain Gain). Furthermore, the tenth proposition give
us a comparison between the Mountfords results and the model with public
education and taxes. In this second case, the conditions to obtain a Brain Gain
are more strict and consequently the probability that the migration of educated
workers implies a BD for the sending country increases.
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4 Conclusion
In this briey note we demonstrate that by introducing an active role of the
government in the education decisions of the agent by public education, taxes
and subsidies, we do not change the main results that Mountford obtain in
the rst section of his work. Furthermore, these new assumptions allow us to
extend these results to di¤erent scenario as the enlarged European Union. In
this context this new specication of the model of Mountford can be a basis to
recent economic and political debates in Europe.
First, by introducing public education we can use the model to contribute to
the debate on the amount of investment in education in Europe. For example,
the possibility to BD from the new EU regions to the former ones and the
massive BD from the EU to the USA implies that the EU countries (formers
and new ones) reduce the investment in education. In this scenario the optimal
policies of the EU institutions is to coordinate all the regions and to dene a
target in the investment in education and research. This coordination is the
target of the "Lisbon Strategy". Furthermore, the subsequent Spring European
Councils (Lisbon 2000, Stockholm 2001, Barcelona 2002 and Brussels in 2003)
have endorsed the ERA (European Research Area) and set a series of objectives
inviting the Commission and the Member States to take due account of the
possible shortage of human resources in R&D as well as of the importance of
enhancing the training and mobility of researchers.
Secondly, this model can be used inside the recent debate on the policies to
reverse the European Brain Drain. Furthermore, it is important to note that
the EU performs a crucial role in these policies by collecting and reviewing the
existent policies and by acting as coordinator of common policies inside the EU.
More deeply, rst the EU commission by several Councils and Reports reminds
that it is not su¢ cient increase the investment in Research but we have to stop
the European Brain Drain, we have to reverse it, Europeans who have moved
abroad would love to come home and we have to remember that the Brain
Drain should work in both directionsby attracting foreign brilliant scientists.
Moreover, the European Commission trays to coordinate the BD policies of the
Member countries. In particular, it suggests, from one side, to invest more
in research (3% of GDP) and, from the other side, to implement policies and
strategies to reverse the Brain Drain and make the Europe attractive to the
researchers from the rest of the world.
Finally, this model can be used to analyze a new scenario where the former
EU regions have not high di¤erences in the productivity and they compete by
attracting educated workers (migration competitions) from the new entrant. In
recent years, there are several "Brain Drain Competition" policies implemented
in Europe. The key strategies and mechanisms used to attract foreign research
graduates in Europe are: to make the academic system more open and exible;
to improve the regulatory conditions particularly on immigration; to improve
the sign-posting and information at national level; to dedicate grants for for-
eign researchers; to adapt income situations to market forces; to provide tax
reductions specically for researchers and knowledge workers; more active in-
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ternational marketing and support for international researchers. It is possible
to divide these policies in seven macro-groups: immigration policies, incentives
to the researchers and their family, grants and scholarships, tax and salaries,
investment in Research, marketing and recruiting policies, studies and analysis
of the immigration policies of the others countries.
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5 Appendix A - proofs
Proof of Proposition (1): T  is always positive hence eM

rc
2E

=

rc
2E

+
c
tw(k)

rc
2E

+

(cr)2
2tw(k)E

>

(cr)2
2tw(k)E

> (cr
)2
4tw(k)E
by the assumption  
1, then

eMr
2E

c  (cr)24tw(k)E > 0 and by E > eM then
tw(k)

E2 (eM)2

4E > 0:
Furthermore, the equation (2) and the maximin criterion ensure level of taxes
lower enough to have educated agents.
Proof of Proposition (2): By E > eM and 2eM (rc) = 2 (rc) +
2

c
tw(k)

(rc) + 2

(cr)2
tw(k)

> 2

(cr)2
tw(k)

> (cr
)2
tw(k)
, then eA;T > e
M :
Proof of Proposition (4):
deA;T
dst 1
= de
M
dst 1
 
1 + 2eMtw(k) + 2r
c

+
0 (st 1)w(k)

E2    eM2 +  crtw(k)2 ; where deMdst 1 =   c(1+r)0(st 1)(t)2w(k) : It
is straightforward that also
deA;T
dst 1
< 0 and that
deA;T
dst 1
> de
M
dst 1
: Thus dstdst 1 =
  1E
deA;T
dst 1
> 0: By assuming that E is high enough so that the most able worker
will always choose to be educated even if no-one in the previous period was
educated and since the agent i with ei = 0 will never choose to be educated,
then this implies that, as in Mountford, there must exist at least one steady
state equilibrium for st6 :
Proof of Proposition (5): T  is always positive hence eM

rc
2(1 )E

=
rctw(k)
2(1 )Ew

+
 
c
w
 
rc
2(1 )E

+

(cr)2
2(1 )Ew

>

(cr)2
2(1 )Ew

> (cr
)2
42(1 )Ew by
the assumption   1, then

eM r

2(1 )E

c  (cr)24(1 )wE > 0 and by E > eM then
w

E2 (eM )
2

4E(1 ) : Furthermore, the equation (2) and the maximin criterion ensure
level of taxes lower enough to have educated agents.
Proof of Proposition (6): By E > eM and 2
 
eM r
 c = 2 rctw(k)w +
2
 
c
w

(rc) + 2

(cr)2
w

> 2

(cr)2
w

> (cr
)2
w ;then e

;G > e
M
 : It is simple
to how that T  > T :
Proof of Proposition (7): Following the proof of Mountford (see Mount-
ford (1997) page 294, proposition 1), a su¢ cient condition for the existence of a
positive level of brain drain (Brain Gain for the source economy) is that dstd > 0
when  = 0. The optimal level of  will be given where dstd = 0 although there
6See paragraph 2.1.5 of Mounftfors (1997) for furthermore details on the possible existence
of multiple steady state.
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may exist other local maxima and minima: Di¤erentiating the average propor-
tion of educated people in the economy st =
(1 ) RE
e
;G
geidei
1 
RE
e
;G
geide
 we solve dstd =
@st
@ +
@st
@e;G
@e;G
@ : The only di¤erence respect the results of Mountford is given
from
@e;G
@ =
   (tw(k) + c(1 + r))  1  2w  eM + 2rc+
+

E2    eM 2 (tw(k))2 + (cr)2
!
(wF tw(k))
(w)2
:
Setting  = 0 and noting that
R E
e;G
g
 
ei

de

1  R E
e;G
g
 
ei

dei

is at most a
quarter, we have that dstd > 0 when
g
 
eA;T
0B@ (tw(k) + c(1 + r
)) 
 (1  2tw(k)  2c(1 + (1  ) r))+
 

E2    eM 2 (tw(k))2   (cr)2
1CA  wF   tw(k)
(tw(k))
2 >
1
4
:
(14)
Proof of Proposition (8): Comparing our condition to have a brain gain
equation (14) and the result of Mountford g
 
eA;T

(tw(k) + c(1 + r
)) (
wF tw(k))
(tw(k))
2 >
1
4 and noting that  

E2    eM 2 (w)2  (cr)2 < 0 and 1 2tw(k) 2c(1+
(1  ) r) < 1, it is straightforward that the LHS of the condition with govern-
ment is lower than the case without government (Mountford case).
6 Appendix B
Autarchic case
The maximization program of the government is
Max
T
b
where, by equations (2) and (3)
b =  1
2
 
tw(k)e
M + 2T   2c  cr+
+
1
2
  
tw(k)e
M + 2T   2c  cr2+
+4
 
tw(k)
 
E   eM  T + c(1 + r) (T   c)
 1
2
The F.O.C. is
 2 + 1
2
  
tw(k)e
M + 2T   2c  cr2+
+4
 
tw(k)
 
E   eM  T + c(1 + r) (T   c)
  12



4
 
tw(k)e
M + 2T   2c  cr  4 (T   c)+
+4
 
tw(k)
 
E   eM  T + c(1 + r)

= 0
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or, after algebraically computation
tw(k)e
M + 2T   2c  cr   T + c+ tw(k) (E)  tw(k)
 
eM
  T + c+ cr
=
h 
tw(k)e
M + 2T   2c  cr2 + 4  tw(k)  E   eM  T + c(1 + r) (T   c)i 12
or
(tw(k)E)
2
=
 
tw(k)e
M + 2T   2c  cr2+4  tw(k)  E   eM  T + c(1 + r) (T   c)
or
(tw(k)E)
2
=
 
tw(k)e
M   cr2 + (2 (T   c))2 + 4  tw(k)eM   cr (T   c)
 4  tw(k)eM   cr) (T   c) + 4 (tw(k)E) (T   c)  4 (T   c)2
or
(tw(k)E)
2
=
 
tw(k)e
M   cr2 + 4 (tw(k)E) (T   c)
nally, the optimal value of taxation is
T  =
tw(k)

E2    eM2
4E
+ c+

eMr
2E

c  (cr
)2
4tw(k)E
> 0:
Mobility case
The maximization program of the government is
Max
T
b
where, by equations (9) and (10)
b =  
 
weM + 2 (1  )T   2c  cr

2
+
+
1
2
  
weM + 2 (1  )T   2c  cr
2
+
+4
 
w
 
E   eM
  (1  )T + c(1 + r) ((1  )T   c)
 1
2
The F.O.C. is
Max
T
b
1
2
  
weM + 2 (1  )T   2c  cr
2
+
+4
 
w
 
E   eM
  (1  )T + c(1 + r) ((1  )T   c)
  12


24 4 (1  )  weM + 2 (1  )T   2c  cr+ 4 (1  ) ((1  )T   c)+
+4 (1  )  w  E   eM   (1  )T + c(1 + r)
35  2 (1  ) = 0
13
or, after algebraically computation
 1 +
  
weM + 2 (1  )T   2c  cr
2
+
+4
 
w
 
E   eM
  (1  )T + c(1 + r) ((1  )T   c)
  12



weM + 2 (1  )T   2c  cr+
  ((1  )T   c) +  w  E   eM   (1  )T + c(1 + r)

= 0
or
weM + 2 (1  )T   2c  cr   (1  )T +
+c+ w (E)  w  eM   (1  )T + c+ cr
=
  
weM + 2 (1  )T   2c  cr
2
+
+4
 
w
 
E   eM
  (1  )T + c(1 + r) ((1  )T   c)
 1
2
or
(wE)
2
=
 
weM   cr
2
+ (2 ((1  )T   c))2 + 4  weM   cr ((1  )T   c)
 4  weM   cr ((1  )T   c) + 4 (wE) ((1  )T   c)  4 ((1  )T   c)2
or
(wE)
2
=
 
weM   cr
2
+ 4 (wE) ((1  )T   c)
nally, the optimal value of taxation is
T  =
w

E2    eM 2
4E (1  ) +
c
(1  ) +

eM r

2 (1  )E

c  (cr
)2
4 (1  )wE > T
:
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